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Abstract 
The existence of Sharī’ah Courts with specific jurisdiction in Zanzibar and Malaysia is a reflection of their importance 
towards the administration of justice among the Muslims. However, these courts have passed through different phases of 
development prior to colonialism and the period when these countries gained independent. This comparative study shows that 
Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts have suffered a considerable intervention of British influences which to the great extent affect 
the jurisdictions of these courts. The problem is further piled with the introduction of multi-court systems by the British. 
Though the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts are retained after independent, the colonial legacy of the British common law still 
can be viewed as the hindrance towards the proper administration of Islamic law before these courts. Alongside this 
backdrop, the paper seeks to examine the current status of Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar and Malaysia. To achieve 
this, this paper examines the historical backgrounds of these courts, their jurisdictions and the procedural laws applied by 
them. This is made purposely in order to access the effectiveness of these courts particularly after these two nations decided 
to retain the multi-court systems after independent. The paper concludes by giving some recommendations which if adopted, 
will enhance the administration of Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts in the jurisdictions under examination.  
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1. Introduction 
The nature of legal systems in Zanzibar and Malaysia is a reflection of their social, economic and cultural history. Sharī’ah 
and Kadhis’ Courts have been in existence before the colonial era. However, during colonialism, the status of these courts 
was merginalised. This marginalization was caused by the introduction of British common law system in both countries. Due 
to this, a dual system of courts was set up in Zanzibar and Malaysia. That is, the civil courts and the Sharī’ah Courts. The 
introduction of dual system has in one way or another brought to stay the British influence in these two countries thereby 
curtailing the application of Islamic law in these areas. The position seems indifferent after independent where the multi-
court systems were retained in these countries. However, many questions remained unanswered as far as the status of 
Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts are concerned. These questions particularly based on the narrow jurisdiction given to the courts, 
conflict of jurisdiction between Sharī’ah Courts and civil courts and the issue of procedural challenges.  
Therefore, this article seeks to discuss the status of Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar and Malaysia. This mainly 
dwells on examination of the jurisdictions and procedural laws applied by these courts. It also examines the influence of 
British common law towards the development of Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts. The discussion on these issues prompted 
some recommendations to enhance the status of Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar and Malaysia while at the same 
time healing the tense between these courts and civil courts.  
 
2. Historical Background of Sharī’ah Courts in Zanzibar and Malaysia 
The historical backgrounds of Zanzibar and Malaysia show the existence of the administration of Islamic law before the 
coming of colonialists in these countries. This is due to the fact that Islamic law was the applicable law of the local people. 
During that time most of the States in Malaysia were in the administration of the Malay Sultanates who administered Islamic 
law in a very organized court system. Islamic law was administered by the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts (Farid S. Shuaib, 
2008). A good example of this administration is in Kelantan where during the reign of Sultan Muhammad I, the Mufti with 
the help of the Kadhis exercises his judicial functions in the Sharī’ah Courts. However, the Sharī’ah Court jurisdiction was 
limited to Islamic personal law and property law. Zanzibar throughout the nineteenth century was a part of the Oman 
Sultanate along with the coastal regions of present-day Tanzania and Kenya. The Sultan of Oman, Seyyid Said bin Sultan 
made Zanzibar his capital in 1832 after suffering resistance and defeat at Mombasa against the Mazrui Arabs. (Erin E. Stiles, 
2009). During this period, the Kadhis’ Courts had their origin in Zanzibar. But when the Kadhi was officially recognised by 
the then Sultan, there were no official court rooms and disputes were resolved in private homes or even along the public 
street. 
With the emergence of British administration and their influence in these countries, English law was introduced 
and the administration of Sharī’ah Courts became merginalised (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1993). The coming of British forced these 
countries to have dual systems that accommodate the civil courts and the application of English laws. This is vividly proved 
with the enactment of Zanzibar Court Decree of 1908. This Decree established four rungs in the court system. Within this 
system, the lowest rung was Assistant Kadhis’ Court which was established in each district as the judge of the British Court 
may think fit to do so. Kadhis’ Court was presided over by a Kadhi or Assistant Kadhi sitting alone. Above the Assistant 
Kadhis’ Courts were District Courts which were established in different districts of Unguja and Pemba. Above the District 
Courts was the Court for Zanzibar and Pemba which was constituted with one British magistrate sitting alone in criminal 
matters while in civil matters two Kadhis were selected by the Judge of the British Court from amongst Ulamaa (Muslim 
scholars). This led to the promulgation of Court Decree No. 20 of 1923 which limits the jurisdiction of the Kadhis’ Courts to 
personal status including marriage, divorce and inheritance cases and suit relating to land in which the subject matter does not 
exceed one thousand and five hundred shillings. Another historical change of the Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar is the 
introduction of Court Decree No. 1963 where time Zanzibar was given an internal self-government. According to section 6 
(i) (b) of the Decree, Kadhis’ Courts were among the courts subordinate to the High Court of Zanzibar. Within the Decree, it 
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is declared that Kadhis’ Courts were subordinate to the High Court. This means that appeals from Kadhis’ Courts were being 
heard by the High Court where majority of the judges were not Muslims (section 26(i) of the 1963 Decree). 
 In Malaysia, administration of justice headed by British judge was introduced in all Federated Malay States and 
the Unfederated Malay States (Farid S. Shuaib, 2008). This led to the introduction of English laws within the States. Though 
there were cases where the English judges applied Islamic law or local customs, the number of cases was very small. The 
English legal principles introduced in the Malay Peninsula directly or indirectly were at the e detriment of the application of 
Islamic law and the jurisdictions of Sharī’ah Courts. With the establishment of a separate court system for English law, the 
jurisdiction and powers of Sharī’ah Courts were minimized (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1993). For example, in criminal matters, 
Sharī’ah Courts were not given jurisdiction to entertain even offences like immoral acts and adultery involving Muslims. 
These matters were entertained by the civil courts where in hearing such cases, the presiding civil court judges would be 
assisted by two Muslims. Besides, civil cases appeals from Kadi’s and Assistant Kadi’s were heard by the Rulers in Council 
who are not Muslims.  
The above discussion shows that Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts used to enjoy wider recognition before the coming 
of British in Zanzibar and Malaysia. These countries share similar historical background as far as the administration of 
Sharī’ah Courts is concerned. However, the colonial experience have whittle down the powers and jurisdiction of the 
Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts in these countries with the establishment of dual systems that frequently interfere with the daily 
activities of these courts. Unfortunately, this was the starting point of British influences within these two countries where the 
jurisdiction of Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts was slowly curtailed. To achieved this, laws were enacted which allowed the 
English Court to have a voice particularly in the administration of Islamic matters.  
After the 1964 revolution, Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar went through enormous changes due to its constitutional 
recognition. In Malaysia, during the period of independence, the Constitutional Commission which was entrusted to come out 
with a proposed constitution for an independent Malaya recognised and recommended for the Sharī’ah Courts to be retained 
within the States because of the Islamic Structures on ground. This proposal is made in conjunction with the idea of 
recognizing the continuation of legal pluralism and the plurality of court systems in Malaya (Farid S. Shuaib, 2008). This 
means that apart from retaining the Sharī’ah Courts, the Commission proposed for the continuation of civil court system and 
granted it with particular power. However, in order to ensure smooth run of Sharī’ah Courts in Malaya, proposal was made to 
empower States to enact law based on Islamic matters (Item 1 of the State List (List II) under the Federal Constitution Ninth 
Scheduled).  
Though the Commission proposed for the continuation of plurality of court systems (civil courts and Sharī’ah 
Courts) in the new Malaya, it failed to propose the need to draw demarcation between these two systems. Among the 
problems caused by this failure is the intervention of civil courts in the Sharī’ah matters. Generally, this started when there 
was a continuous sanctioned intervention of civil courts in matters based on Islamic law. Thus, the inherent or supervisory 
powers of the civil courts have caused the Sharī’ah Courts to face difficulties in deciding the matters which are regarded to 
be within the jurisdiction. 
With the independence of the Federation of Malaya in 1957, an opportunity arose for Muslims to reassert their 
belief and to restore the Islamic judicial institution. The Federation of Malaya Constitution 1957 states that Islam is the 
religion of the Federation with the right of other religions to be professed and practiced in harmony (Article 3(1) of the 
Federal Constitution). States are allowed to set up Sharī’ah Courts. However, it is argued that the Federal Constitution 
ignores the position of Sharī’ah Courts where even the definition of ‘law’ within the constitution does not include the Islamic 
law (Article 160 of the Federal Constitution). It only made mention of Sharī’ah Courts in the State List (Ahmad Ibrahim, 
1993). It is further argued to be contradictory for a country where Islam is proclaimed as the official religion but the Sharī’ah 
Courts which administer Islamic law receive little attention apart from Article 121 of the Federal Constitution (Andrew, 
1995). There is no even any constitutional obligation for these courts to exist, unlike the High Courts, the Court of Appeal 
and the Federal Court. Thus, it is submitted that the Sharī’ah Courts have inferior jurisdiction and their status is not higher 
than that of the other ‘inferior courts’ mentioned in Article 121 of the Constitution. The same situation is witnessed in 
Zanzibar as the Constitution provides for the establishment of the Subordinate Courts to the High Court. Under this 
provision, Kadhis’ Court was established. Article 100 of the Zanzibar Constitution, 1984 empowers the House of 
Representatives to establish other Courts subordinate to the High Court. This shows that although Kadhis’ Court has 
constitutional flavor, its power is in the true sense limited. 
 
3. Current Jurisdiction of Kadhis’ and Sharī’ah Courts 
The power and jurisdiction of Kadhis’ Courts is provided for in the Kadhis’ Court Act 1985 and the District Kadhis’ Court 
has been given power to determine matters of Islamic personal  such as marriage, claims of maintenance, divorce, 
guardianships, custody of children, Wakf or religious charitable trusts, gift and inheritance (section 6 (1) of Kadhis’ Court 
Act, 1985). From this provision, it can be argued that the Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar is a judicial institution set out to deal 
with cases arising from limited matters relating to Islamic personal law. Therefore, it is very clear that the Kadhis’ Courts do 
not deal with any criminal matters and even in dealing with civil matters, their jurisdiction is very restricted.  For example, 
even though the Kadhis’ Courts have jurisdiction to deal with the issue of divorce but they lack jurisdiction to deal with the 
matters arising after divorce like the issue of matrimonial property which is accruing from divorce among the parties.  
It cannot be denied that the incompetency of the Kadhis in dealing with the cases of different nature is something to 
be given attention, but on the other hand this must not be taken as an excuse towards the process of expanding the power and 
jurisdiction to deal with other civil and criminal matters. This must be done with the view of enhancing justice among the 
Muslims (who are majority) in Zanzibar.  
On the other hand, Malaysia being a Federation has distributed legislative powers to Parliament and States 
legislative assemblies (Farid Sufian, 2003, Wan Arfah, 2009). The Sates, or the Federation for the Federal Territories, 
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establish Sharī’ah Courts with its own structure and organisation. It is important to note that Sharī’ah courts are established 
outside the civil courts system (Mohamed Ismail, 2005). There is no appeal to the civil courts. The law provides for a three-
tier system (Shamrahayu, 2011). Appeals are made within the Sharī’ah courts system. The law provides for the appointment 
and removal of Sharī’ah court judges. The law also provides for Sharī’ah prosecutors and Sharī’ah enforcement agencies. 
Sharī’ah Courts are independent from the religious authority or the Majlis Agama and the office of the Mufti. Thus, 
jurisdiction given to the States and the Sharī’ah courts is limited. Islamic law in Malaysia applies to Muslims only and is 
basically confined to matters as specified in the State List of the Federal Constitution (Mohammad Hashim, 1997). The State 
List stipulates marriage, divorce, division of matrimonial property, maintenance, charity endowments, bequest and 
inheritance. Even in regard to the subjects included, there are many Federal laws which extend the scope and application of 
Federal laws. Furthermore, Parliament has been given the authority under the Constitution to enact Islamic law in respect of 
all matters (including Islamic banking and takaful). As a result of this power, the Banking and Financial Institution Act 1989 
was introduced to allow conventional banks to introduce Islamic Banking services using their current facilities (Shamrahayu, 
2009). Therefore, in early 2003 a Muamalat Division was created in the civil courts to deal with matters involving Islamic 
banking and takaful. It is argued that the creation of such a division causes a lot of controversies and constitutional debate. 
This indicates that the jurisdiction of Sharī’ah courts in dealing with civil matters is only limited to the Islamic personal law. 
As to criminal jurisdiction, the Federal List provides that the Parliament has powers to legislate on criminal law 
(Item 4 of the Federal List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution). Again, the State legislatures have been 
empowered to legislate particularly on establishing offences against the precept of Islam, except in regard to matters included 
in the Federal List (Item 1 of the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution). This means to say that 
unlike in civil jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of Sharī’ah courts in criminal matters must be conferred by federal law. However, 
this is not the case in the Sharī’ah Courts of the Federal Territories as there is no need for the federal law to confer criminal 
jurisdiction since the federal law itself is the one which directly establish the Sharī’ah Courts and confer such jurisdiction 
(Item 6 (e) of the State List under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal Constitution). It is until 1965 when the Parliament 
enacted the Muslim Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act (Act No. 23 of 1965) which is applicable to all the States in Malaysia 
(section 1 (2) of the Sharī’ah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, 1965). The Act confers jurisdiction to the Sharī’ah Courts 
in respect of the offences relating to conversion of religion, matrimonial offences such as cruelty to wives, offence relating to 
sex such as unlawful intercourse, close proximity (khalwat), etc. For example, in the penal jurisdiction, the Muslim Courts 
(Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, 1984 provided that such jurisdiction should not be exercised in respect of any offence punishable 
with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or any fine exceeding RM1,000 or with both. The Act was amended in 
1984 where the jurisdiction of the Sharī’ah courts has been extended to deal with cases punishable with imprisonment up to 
three years, or fine up to RM5,000 or whipping up to six strokes or the combination of all these. 
Efforts have been taken by some States in Malaysia to extend the jurisdiction of the Sharī’ah Courts in criminal 
matters. For example, the Sharī’ah Criminal Code (II) Enactment 1993 of the State of Kelantan which intends to create 
hudud criminal law was enacted (Andrew, 1995). This enactment (though not yet come into force) imposes a structure of 
punishments which exceed the jurisdictional limits of the Sharī’ah Courts as specified under the constitutional specifications 
of the State List (Mohammad Hashim, 1997). The introduction of this Enactment has brought a debate concerning the 
application of Islamic law in Malaysia. The Federal government does not accept the idea and consider the Enactment to be 
over the prospects of attaining justice (Mohammad Hashim, 1997). In this respect the government argued that the application 
of hudud (as proposed by the State of Kelantan) only in a part of Malaysia and as an isolated case from the rest of the Islamic 
law may cause the failure to achieve justice. 
The above discussion proves that though the jurisdiction of Sharī’ah Courts in criminal matters has been extended 
recently, yet there is a need for them to be given more powers like the civil courts. This is due to the fact that once Sharī’ah 
Courts have been granted the criminal jurisdiction the essence of enhancing the deterrence and punishment measures become 
mandatory. Thus, some amendments should be made to the Sharī’ah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, 1965 so as to ensure 
better jurisdiction of Sharī’ah Courts in Malaysia. 
The two court system, namely the Sharī’ah system and the civil court system, have not always enjoyed an amicable 
relationship. Overlap and encroachment of jurisdiction occurred and the finality of the Sharī’ah Court decision was often 
doubted. Sharī’ah Courts were established in the various states under their respective Administration of Islamic law 
Enactments. Although Sharī’ah Courts are established to deal with Sharī’ah questions, jurisdictional conflicts arose when 
civil courts exercised their jurisdiction over Muslim parties by various specious arguments. Furthermore, even the relevant 
State enactments provide for the prevalence of decisions of civil courts over Sharī’ah Court decisions in the event of conflict. 
For instance, it is provided in the Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, 1952 that: 
 
“Nothing in this Enactment contained shall affect the jurisdiction of any civil courts an in the event of 
any difference or conflict between the decision of a court of a Kathi Besar or Kathi and the decision of a 
civil court acting within its jurisdiction, the decision of the civil court shall prevail.” 
 
The above provision has received judicial pronouncement and consideration in a number of cases where it was emphasised 
that the decision of the civil courts would prevail over the decision of the Sharī’ah Courts (For example, in Myriam v 
Mohamed Ariff [1971] 1 MLJ 265; Tengku Mariam v Commissioner of Religious Affairs, Trengganu & Ors [1960] 1 MLJ 
10). The problem is piled more by the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which is considered to be the overriding legislation. The 
legislative set up of this Act further undermined the Sharī’ah Courts and Islamic law. In this effect, the civil courts consider 
themselves as having jurisdiction over matters that are under Sharī’ah Courts (Farid Sufian, 2003). Therefore, to address this 
challenge, the need to make amendment to the Federal Constitution becomes necessary. Generally, the 1988 amendment 
inserts a clause which expressly excludes civil courts in matters that Sharī’ah Courts have jurisdiction (Farid Sufian, 1999). It 
was hoped that the amendment would reduce jurisdictional conflict and friction between the Sharī’ah Courts and civil courts 
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(Mohammed Imam, 1994). This is due to the fact that clause (1A) of Article 121 bars civil courts from hearing matters falling 
under the Sharī’ah Courts’ jurisdiction (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1989, Abdul Aziz, 2001). This is substantiated with Harun Hashim, 
a Supreme Court judge (as he then was) when he argued that amendment of Article 121 (1A) was made in order to grant 
exclusive jurisdiction to the Sharī’ah Courts in the administration of Islamic law so as to prevent conflicting jurisdiction 
between the civil courts and the Sharī’ah Courts (Dato’ Faiza, 2000, Pawancheek, 2004). However, the conflicts between 
Sharī’ah Courts and civil courts are still burning due to the fact that civil courts still retain the power of judicial review of 
administrative acts and decisions by inferior tribunals including the Sharī’ah Courts (Andrew, 1995). Also there are some 
areas which cause the conflicts based on subject matter to be determined and type of cases which will fall within the Sharī’ah 
Courts’ jurisdiction. According to Farid Sufian, the jurisdictional conflict between Sharī’ah Courts and civil courts has 
provided several issues and questions which remain unanswered (Farid Sufian, 1999). Among those issues is whether item 1 
of the State List confers jurisdiction on Sharī’ah Courts as most of the statutes which establish Sharī’ah Courts do not 
expressly confer jurisdiction on Sharī’ah Courts in all matters under item 1.  
Thus, though the legislature intends to solve the jurisdictional conflict between Sharī’ah Courts and civil courts by 
incorporating clause (1A) in article 121 of the Federal Constitution, the decided cases prove otherwise. Thus, in simple words 
it can be said that the jurisdictional conflict between these courts is still not completely resolved. 
 
4. Procedural Laws Applied in the Sharī’ah Courts 
The rules of evidence and procedure play very important role in the administration of justice. These rules prohibit false 
evidence. As to the position of rules of procedure and practice in Zanzibar, the Chief Justice is given power to make rules of 
court to be followed in Kadhis’ Courts (section 9 (1) of the Kadhis’ Courts Act, No. 3, 1985). However, the said rules are yet 
to be made. This further pave way for a continue application of Civil Procedure Decree in the absence of those rules as 
prescribed. 
Meanwhile, failure of Kadhis’ Courts to have their own Civil Procedure based on Islamic principles together with 
the lack of knowledge of Civil Procedure Decree among the Kadhis have caused many problems particularly when the parties 
decide to go for appeals. For instance, parties may not know under which grounds or by which procedures a Kadhi gives a 
particular decision. Also, they do not know which issue he/she should raise before the higher court. It is important to note 
from District Kadhis’ Court up to the Chief Kadhis’ Court, the involvement of advocate is not allowed; only Wakils and 
person who are holding power of attorney are allowed to appear in Kadhis’ Court to represent the parties. The term ‘Wakil’ 
has been defined by Rule 6 of the Legal Practitioners Rules, Chapter 28 of the Law of Zanzibar, 1946 as a person admitted to 
practice as such as licensed to practice as such under this Rule. Most of the time these Wakils are those retired court clerks or 
magistrates given the opportunity to represent litigants before the court of law. 
Though, it can be argued that there are some reasons for not allowing advocates to appear before the Kadhis’ 
Courts, generally, the idea of not granting them audience before these courts is another setback in the administration of 
justice. The case might be different when it appears that those Wakils appointed hold the qualifications of having Islamic 
knowledge and Civil Procedure Decree. If that was the case, they might improve the administration purpose under Kadhis’ 
Courts. The main question is how justice can be done in a situation where both the Kadhis and parties to the cases are not 
well conversant with the procedure provided by the law of the country.  
As to the point of evidence, it is provided that the law and rules of evidence to be applied in Kadhis’ Courts 
including that of a Chief Kadhis’ Court shall be those applicable under Muslim law (Section 7 of Kadhis’ Courts Act, 1985). 
The same section insists for  all witnesses who appear before these courts to be heard without discrimination on ground of 
religion, sex or otherwise and each issue of fact to be decided upon an assessment of credibility of all evidence before the 
court and not upon the number of witnesses who have given evidence. It is observed that the law of evidence which was 
introduced since colonial period and being applied by Kadhis in their courts had caused some problems for many Kadhis 
particularly when they preferred proper Muslim witnesses. For example, it is reported that Sheikh Umar (who was a Kadhi in 
1945) in his judgment did not accept the plaintiff’s witnesses on the ground that they were not socially knowledgeable on the 
subject, holding that proof could only be established from two knowledgeable men (Stockreiter, 2010). By doing so, he 
ignored the stand of the Evidence Decree 1917 which made people regardless of their religion, sex and social background 
acceptable witnesses in the Kadhis’ Courts. Though it is well stated that the law and rules of evidence to be applied currently 
in the Kadhis’ Courts shall be those applicable under Islamic law, the involvement of Evidence Decree based on common law 
principles cannot be undermined. This can be clearly seen when the High Court is involved to hear appeal from case 
emanated from Kadhis’ Courts. For example, in Idrissa Hussein Mrisho v Sihaba Soud Waziri, Civil Appeal No. 30 of 2009 
held at High Court, Zanzibar (Unreported), Omar O. Makungu J. (the Chief Justice) in his judgment considered the 
application of law of Evidence Cap. 5 and argued that evidence under Kadhis’ Court must be considered without any 
discrimination based on religion, sex etc.  
The above verdict given by the court proves that there are no specific rules of Evidence based on Islamic principles to be 
followed in the Kadhis’ Courts. The failure of having these rules has caused a lot of difficulties to the Kadhis particularly 
when they are hearing cases of different nature.  
While Kadhis’ Courts are still in dilemma on enacting the procedural laws based on Islamic principles, the case is not the 
same in Malaysia. The current position of procedural laws in the Sharī’ah Courts in Malaysia is much better compare to the 
Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar. However, in the early period the case was similar between Kadhis’ Courts and Sharī’ah Courts 
as Kadhis and judges in both Zanzibar and Malaysia have to apply the procedural laws as applied in the civil courts. It is 
stated that in the past, the only legislation on the administration of the Muslim law in the Malay States was the 
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment. This law among other thing dealt with the constitution and powers of the Council 
of Muslim Religion, the Mufti and the power to issue fatwa or rulings on Muslim Law, the law relating to Muslim marriage, 
divorce, wakafs and baitulmal and the Sharī’ah Courts. The provisions of this enactment were very limited in their scope and 
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in particular the law relating to the procedure and evidence to be applied in the Sharī’ah Courts was inadequate and required 
reference to the civil law applicable in the civil courts. There was a need to have new law to deal with the evidence and 
procedure to be applicable in the Sharī’ah Courts. Due to this, and in order to assist the Sharī’ah Court in its daily functions, 
laws relating to the Sharī’ah law of Evidence, the Sharī’ah Code of Criminal Procedure and the Sharī’ah Civil Procedure 
have been enacted in different States of Malaysia. It is worthy to note that in Malaysia, the substantive and procedural laws 
are within the legislative powers of the State for States’ Sharī’ah Courts and the Federation for the Federal Territories’ 
Sharī’ah Courts (Halsbury, 2002). With the enactment of these laws, the judges and officers of the Sharī’ah Court and the 
lawyers and parties who appear before them have been given an adequate guidance on the rule of procedure and evidence to 
be applied (for example, the Civil Procedure (Federal Territories) Act 1998). 
The above discussion shows that procedural laws are very important rules to be applied in the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ 
Courts. However, among Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts in these two countries, Malaysia is quite far ahead in terms of enacting 
and applying these procedural laws. The situation in Zanzibar reveals that Kadhis’ Courts are still applying the Evidence and 
Civil Procedure Decrees which are cemented by the practice and procedure of Common law. This encourages the pollution of 
Common law principles with that of the Islamic law. It is observed that lack of rules of procedure and practice (based on 
Islamic principles) to be applied before the Kadhis’ Courts as well as the ignorance of most of the Kadhis in applying the 
procedures and practices as provided under Civil Procedure Decree can be seen as the main sources of miscarriage or 
misplacement of justice in these courts. 
 
5. Lessons to be Learnt  
The above comparative analysis shows that the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts are very important institutions in the 
administration of Muslim affairs in Malaysia and Zanzibar. Currently, these courts face a lot of drawbacks. This, to a great 
extent, affects the level of expectation as expected by the communities. Therefore, this article reveals the lessons that if 
implemented will solve the problems which face the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts. It will also ensure proper administration of 
justice within the countries under review.  
 
5.1 Unification of National Courts 
The existence of legal pluralism in Zanzibar and Malaysia is a reflection of the historical background of these countries. 
There are two court systems in Zanzibar (the civil courts and Kadhis’ courts) and three court systems in Malaysia (the civil 
courts, the Sharī’ah courts and the native courts) which have jurisdiction over different groups of people and apply different 
laws. It is alleged that colonialism over these countries is essentially responsible for the existence of multi-court systems 
(Farid Sufian, 1999). This is further piled due to the fact that even after independent these two nations determine the fate of 
their indigenous law and the received law as practiced during the colonialism. Though it is argued that the existence of 
different court systems and laws in Zanzibar and Malaysia is a reflection of the reality of the different cultures and religions 
practice and profess by the people, the need to unify the court systems within these countries is something mandatory. It can 
be observed that justice and equality are the cherished values of both Islamic law and common law and they are inherently 
holistic and Unitarian (Mohammad Hashim, 1997). There is no inherent need for bifurcation and division of justice under the 
Islamic and statutory laws of Malaysia and even Zanzibar. 
Due to the above, there is a need for Zanzibar and Malaysia to consider reorganization of their judiciaries along the 
lines that have been taken by some countries like Egypt and Sudan by having a system of unified national courts that are 
committed to the same standards of efficiency and diligence in the services of justice, but may decide to have Sharī’ah 
benches within the general structure of a unified judiciary. In order for this process to work efficiently there is a need to have 
uniformity particularly in the administration of Islamic law within these two countries. The situation might be easier in 
Zanzibar where no much complication since there is a straight application of Islamic law administered by the Kadhis’ Courts 
together with the involvement of High Court at the level of appeal. However, this is not the case in Malaysia as the 
administration of Islamic law is within the States’ powers and solely to the Sharī’ah Courts. Therefore, in order to ensure that 
the process of unifying the court system in Malaysia is gaining a full swing, there is a need to have a substantive uniformity 
in the administration of Islamic law for the whole States in Malaysia. It must be noted that the idea proposed by the authors is 
not a strange thing mainly with the historical background of Malaysia.  For this purpose, the efforts to unify the 
administration of family law in Malaysia can be used to substantiate the need of having uniformity in the administration of 
Islamic law within the country.  
The development of Islamic Family Law was under review during the 1970s. As at that time each state had its own 
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment that regulated all matters under Islamic law, from mosques and offences against 
the precepts of the religion to family law (Mehrun, 1994). Noting the reality and weaknesses which existed in the enactments 
passed previously, new enactments were proposed as substitute to the previous ones (Abdullah Abu, 1990). The aim of 
drafting the model Islamic Family Law Act was to separate family law from other matters, to introduce measures to resolve 
existing problems, and to bring about uniformity in the state laws (Mehrun, 1994). Before 1984, each State had its own 
legislation on the administration of the family law (Ahmad Ibrahim, 1997). There was a need to have a uniform law on this 
matter and a Committee headed by Tengku Zaid from the Attorney-General’s Chambers was appointed to prepare a model 
enactment. This model code was later agreed to by the Council of Rulers and after that referred to the various States for 
enactment of the legislation. Unfortunately, the hope to have a uniform Islamic family law in this way was not achieved, as 
some states particularly Kelantan, Kedah and Malacca, made significant changes to the draft. In this respect, each state 
passed an enactment based on the model but with modifications that were deemed necessary by each State’s Religious 
Affairs Department (Mehrun, 1994). 
From the above statement it can be observed that the idea of unification is not new in Malaysia. Thus, the efforts 
taken to unify Islamic family law can be taken as a means towards the process of having a substantive uniformity in the 
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administration of Islamic law for the whole Malaysia. This can be done by reviewing the previous efforts to unify the Islamic 
family so as to know the factors which caused the process not to get full success as it was anticipated.   
The unification of legal systems among other things will prove to be more economically effective in these countries 
and at the same time it will substantially reduce the overlapping of jurisdiction (between Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts and civil 
law courts) which has been witnessed in many occasions particularly in Malaysia. It cannot be denied that for the process of 
merging the court systems to materialise there is a work to be done. It is proposed for the judiciary in Zanzibar and Malaysia 
to formulate a structure that will suit and maintain the demographical nature of religious and cultural pluralism within the 
countries. In doing so, the existence of Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts together with the application of Islamic law will still 
continue to apply to the Muslims. This assurance will not curtail the rights of non-Muslims as the reality of these countries 
being multi-religious societies will still be maintained and acknowledged within the proposed unified courts system. This 
argument is substantiated by Ahmad Ibrahim (2002) in the following dictum: 
 
“We are proud in Malaysia, of our inter-racial harmony and in building up a caring and loving society for 
our nation. We should strive to understand one another better and in the application of our laws try to find 
ways of respect and reconciliation rather than create conflict and dominance.” 
 
The above quotation shows the importance of solving the social and even judicial conflicts amicably within a particular 
society. This can be used as a cornerstone towards the process of resolving the judicial conflicts between civil and the 
Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar and Malaysia by introducing the unified national courts within these countries. 
 
5.2 The Essence of Extending Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts’ Jurisdiction  
Many doubts have been raised on the ability of Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts to administer wide jurisdiction. In other words, the 
ability of the Kadhis and judges to maintain justice within the society has been put in question. The doubters argue that the 
aspect of justice dispenses by the Kadhis and judges are unprincipled and arbitrary. Thus, the term ‘Kadhi justice’ would 
symbolize a total denial of the law. The above argument against the Kadhis and judges has been the stand of many civil court 
judges even in other jurisdictions. For example, in the case of Terminiello v Chicago (1949) 337 US 1 it was stated that: 
 
“This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like Kadi under a tree 
dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency.” 
 
The above quotation shows the wrong perception of many people particularly judge of the civil courts towards the courts 
with Sharī’ah jurisdiction. However, the critics fail to understand that Islam emphasises much on the aspect of doing justice. 
Therefore, unprincipled and arbitrary law-making are not the characteristics of the administration of justice in Islam as 
applied by the Kadhis’ Courts. 
The ability of the Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts to be entrusted to administer current issues like Islamic banking and 
Takaful is another argument given by the doubters. This can be proved by looking at the current position of Malaysia where 
Parliament has been given the authority under the Constitution to enact Islamic law in respect of Islamic banking and takaful. 
As a result of this power, the Banking and Financial Institution Act 1989 was introduced to allow conventional banks to 
introduce Islamic Banking services using their current facilities. Therefore, Muamalat Division was established in the civil 
courts to deal with matters involving Islamic banking and takaful. However, the creation of such a division causes a lot of 
controversies and constitutional debate. The simple question which is clicking the mind of any reasonable man is why civil 
courts have been entrusted to deal with Islamic banking and takaful instead of Sharī’ah Courts. While someone still thinking 
the answer, it is worthy to note that in Zanzibar, Islamic Banking services have already being established. Apparently, if the 
problems arose from the administration of Islamic Banking services, it is the civil courts which are entrusted to deal with 
these matters. This indicates that the jurisdiction of Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar is only confined to civil matters. Nonetheless, 
even in entertaining the civil matter, the jurisdiction of Kadhis’ Courts is only limited to the Islamic personal law. This 
situation shows the need to expand the jurisdiction of Kadhis’ Courts in dealing with civil matters while at the same time 
emphasis must be given for the introduction of criminal jurisdiction to deal with criminal matters. Though it may be argued 
that time is not up for the expansion of civil jurisdiction and the introduction of criminal jurisdiction in the Kadhis’ Courts in 
Zanzibar, there is a need to consider the historical nature and demands of Muslims (who are majority) in Zanzibar. It must be 
known that in order to ensure that the teachings and principles of Islam are well practiced by the Muslim community; there is 
a need for the administration of justice to be administered according to Islamic law. 
The above discussion shows that though the doubters might have strong arguments against the notion of expanding 
the jurisdiction of the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts, the Zanzibar and Malaysian legal histories show the ability of these 
courts to administer Islamic law and maintaining the administration of justice by using their own competent officials. 
Therefore, there is a need to extend the jurisdiction of Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts in both civil and criminal matters so as to 
ensure better administration of Muslim affairs within these two countries. Thus, to guarantee smooth process, the 
introduction of training to the Kadhis and judges is something indispensable. This must go hand in hand with the idea of 
heightening the qualifications for someone to be appointed as a Kadhi or a judge of the Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts.   
 
5.3 The Need to Enact Substantive and Procedural Laws 
It cannot be denied that law has certain purposes within the community. Apart from ensuring order, it aims to satisfy social 
wants by expressing the values and convictions of a given society. As a consequence, law is an indispensable mechanism for 
the creation and maintenance of peace and stability in society. Meanwhile, law must adapt changes, mainly when the society 
needs changes in order to meet the demands of the social changes in a particular society. In other words, laws are changed to 
meet the new needs and requirements of society and law is a response to social ‘demands’. The above remarks prove the need 
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of enhancing the substantive and procedural laws which must be applied in the courts with Sharī’ah jurisdiction in Malaysia 
and Zanzibar. However, in order to accomplish this process, more emphasis must be given to the Kadhis’ Courts of Zanzibar 
where these things seem to be forgotten. Though the Kadhis’ Courts Act gives power to Chief Justice to make rules of the 
court to be followed in the Kadhis’ Courts, these rules have yet to be made. Lack of rules before the Kadhis’ Courts has 
caused difficulties for the Kadhis as mostly they are obliged to apply the Civil Procedure Decree and Evidence Decree which 
are cemented by the practice and procedures of Common law. As to the introduction of Islamic criminal procedure, this 
cannot be materialized without Kadhis’ Courts being given the jurisdiction to deal with criminal matters. It is insisted above 
that considering the Muslim population in Zanzibar, the extension of Kadhis’ Courts’ jurisdiction to deal with criminal 
matters is something indispensable. Therefore, the introduction of criminal jurisdiction in the Kadhis’ Courts must go hand in 
hand with the enactment of procedural law (Islamic criminal procedure) which will enhance the administration of criminal 
matters. Generally, the enactment of substantial and procedural laws will enhance the case management of these courts as 
they will guide Kadhis towards the process of reaching decisions which are just and equitable.   
As far as the Malaysian experience is concerned, much has been done on enacting the procedural laws within the States and 
the Federal Territories. Nevertheless, the substantial changes which continue to occur in Malaysia must also involve the 
enactment of other substantial laws so as to accommodate the changes and needs of the Malaysian community.  Though it is 
argued that the codification of Islamic law has its positive and negative implications, but due to the need of the societies, the 
purpose of codification is not questionable (Mahmud Saedon, 1989). Ideally, the codification of substantial and procedural 
laws in different countries has been shaped by their various sociopolitical contexts; however, most of these modern laws 
continue to espouse the Sharī’ah principles on the issues of marriage and divorce, evidence and procedures (civil and 
criminal) to be applied in the courts which have Sharī’ah jurisdiction. Therefore, due to the need of doing justice among the 
parties in the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts, the codification of substantial and procedural laws become inevitable.  
 
6. Conclusion 
From the discussion above, it is clear that the Sharī’ah/Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar and Malaysia play a pivotal role in the 
administration of justice among Muslims before and after independence. Although these courts were retained after 
independence, the colonial legacy of the British common law can be said to be the hindrance for proper administration of 
Islamic law. This perception is substantiated in view of the constitutional position of these courts. It is also obvious from its 
jurisdiction which always conflict with jurisdiction that of civil courts and the procedural laws applied by them.  
There are similarities and differences between Sharī’ah Courts in Malaysia and Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar as far 
as the status in their legal systems is concerned. The study shows that the Constitutions of Zanzibar and Malaysia ignore the 
position of Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts. This is due to the fact that Sharī’ah Courts in Malaysia receive little attention apart 
from Article 121 of the Federal Constitution while Kadhis’ Courts have been established as one of the subordinate courts to 
the Zanzibar High Court. This position has led to the constitutional amendment which takes out the Article which directly 
established the Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar. This led many people to believe that the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts status is not 
higher than that of the other inferior courts. Also, the status of Sharī’ah Courts in Malaysia appears to be higher than the 
Kadhis’ Courts in Zanzibar. This is due to the fact that while their jurisdiction in civil matters is very narrow, no criminal 
jurisdiction is granted to them. However, the Sharī’ah Courts in Malaysia do not always enjoy an amicable relationship with 
the civil courts. This happens mostly when the civil courts make doubt on the final decisions of the Sharī’ah Courts. 
The difference between these courts is evident in substantive and the procedural laws which are applicable in the 
courts. While both legal systems fail to record good development on enacting substantive laws in the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ 
Courts, much has been done on enacting the procedural laws within the States and the Federal Territories of Malaysia 
compared to Zanzibar. Thus, failure of Kadhis’ Courts to have comprehensive procedural laws, to a great extent, jeopardises 
the whole process of reaching a just conclusion. 
Therefore, to overcome the above problems and in order for the Sharī’ah and Kadhis’ Courts to gain their true status in these 
two legal systems, the above suggestions proposed by the authors can be used as the cornerstones of the intended changes.  
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